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Chrismar Hotel Ltd v Stanbic Bank Zambia Ltd SCZ Selected Judgment No 6 of 2017 p. 160
Dunia P. Zongwe 4
This case dramatizes the bank charges that most depositors are smacked with. Interest,
overdraft charges, extension charges, restructuring fee, late charges, base rate, default interest,
compound interest… In Chrismar Hotel Ltd v Stanbic Bank Zambia Ltd, Mumba Malila JS
opened the judgment as follows: 5
Bank charges, especially those not expressly agreed to by customers, are increasingly
becoming a worrisome consumer controversy in this country. Many a bank customer
have quietly grumbled about what is viewed as unagreed debits on customers’ accounts
made up of variously labeled bank charges. This coupled with the seemingly unlimited
authority of banks to do what they wish with customers’ accounts in ensuring their
profitability, has generated considerable resentment to some banking practices by
consumers of banking services.
Apart from hinting at the eventual outcome, this opening soundbite captures both the core
issues and the true significance of this case. More importantly, this case illustrates how bank
charges can undermine freedom of contract – this sacrosanct principle of contract law and
commercial law. Freedom of contract undergirds the market economy, as opposed to an
economy ruled by command from above, the state. And two tenets of the Zambian legal system
are precisely ‘private initiative’ and ‘wealth’ creation. 6
Hopefully, Malila JS will carry over the keen sense of context and synthesis he displayed in
Chrismar Hotel into the Constitutional Court that he now heads as Zambia’s new Chief Justice.
Though he did not extend this sense of context to society’s economic dimensions in that
judgment, the man who chairs the Constitutional Court will have a golden opportunity to shape
fundamental questions and zoom in on their many aspects, not least of which the economy. To
foreshadow such broader perspective, this commentary imagines how the court in Chrismar
Hotel could have justified the outcome of that case had it weighed in on the consequences of
heavy bank charges for commerce and society.
Facts
In the first semester of 2008, the appellant, Chrismar Hotel Ltd, needed finance to buy some
equipment, including earth-moving equipment. It therefore solicited funds from the respondent
bank, Stanbic Bank Zambia Ltd, with which it had held several accounts, obtained credit
facilities (for example, mortgages and debentures), and established a longstanding relationship.
The respondent bank agreed to lend money to the appellant hotel.
Thus, the hotel and the bank (hereinafter ‘the parties’) entered into eight distinct yet identically
worded finance leases. For a total sum of 1.7 million US dollars, the eight leases each specified
the amount that the respondent bank would finance together with the finance charges that the
appellant should pay. The appellant secured the finance leases with third party mortgages over
two properties. 7 In terms of the finance leases, the appellant had to repay the leased sums in
J.S.D. (Cornell); LL.M. (Cornell); Cert. (Univ. Montréal); LL.B. (Univ. Namibia); B.Juris (Univ. Namibia).
Chrismar Hotel Ltd v Stanbic Bank Zambia Ltd SCZ Selected Judgment No 6 of 2017 p. 160 [J2] (hereinafter
the ‘Chrismar Hotel’ case).
6
1991 Constitution of Zambia, as amended by Act 2 of 2016, Art 10(1).
7
A ‘third party mortgage’ arises where a third party (i.e., a person other than the debtor or the creditor) establishes
a mortgage on his own property on the creditor’s behalf as security for the debtor’s debt. In a separate agreement
with the creditor, the third party commits to the sale of his property under execution if the debtor fails to pay the
debt for which the mortgage serves as collateral.
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60 monthly installments ending on May 30th, 2013. By the time the lease ended, total
repayment had to amount to 2,280,121.00 US dollars.
On December 4th, 2012, the appellant had paid back a total sum of 2,413,168.43 US dollars,
but the respondent bank continued to apply a variety of charges and expenses with interest. The
appellant therefore sued the respondent, complaining that the respondent breached the finance
leases and the law. But, on May 23rd, 2016, except for the appellant’s submissions on the valueadded tax (VAT), the High Court dismissed the appellant’s suit with costs. Thereupon, the
hotel appealed against the High Court’s ruling to the Supreme Court of Zambia.
The parties’ arguments
In the Supreme Court, the appellant raised eight grounds of appeal. In summary, the appellant
submitted that the High Court trial judge erred in law and in fact because: 8
1. he held that the respondent hotel could overdraw the appellant’s account although the
parties never signed any overdraft agreement;
2. he failed to speak to the question whether, given that the respondent lacked the authority
to transfer money from the appellant’s Kwacha account to the Dollar account and vice
versa, the transfers, overdraft, and interest charges the respondent made were illegal;
3. he held that the respondent could overdraw the appellant’s account by way of standing
orders 9 to cover the lease facility payments and still apply late charges, which ought to
have been paid by the overdraft;
4. he held that, notwithstanding the fact that the finance leases did not provide for
extension charges, the respondent could unilaterally apply those charges;
5. he failed to consider that, despite the restructuring fee that the respondent charged to
the appellant in 2010 to reduce monthly installments to 25,000.00 US dollars, the
respondent continued to charge interest on the monthly installments over and above the
restructured amount;
6. he failed to address the discrepancy between the 336,066.32 US dollars charged to the
appellant and the 188,435.08 US dollars explained by the respondent in its
reconciliation, implying that the discrepancy reflected late charges or penal interest;
7. he held that Clause 2.4 intertwined with Clause 11.3 of the finance leases and that both
relate to compound interest; and
8. he failed to find that the respondent charged late interest in addition to compound
interest, which contravenes the Banking and Financial Services (Cost of Borrowing)
Regulations 10.
Counsel for the appellant, State Counsel Mwansa and Ms. Findlay, astutely grouped these eight
grounds of appeal into three clusters: one dealing with the overdraft (i.e., questions 1, 2, and
3), another with the extension charges (i.e., questions 4 and 5), and a third with the remaining
issues compositely (i.e., questions 6, 7, and 8). 11
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J8]-[J10].
A standing order refers to the automated system whereby a person instructs its bank to pay another person a
certain sum of money at regular intervals.
10
Banking and Financial Services (Cost of Borrowing) Regulations, Statutory Instrument Number 179 of 1995 of
the Laws of Zambia.
11
See Chrismar Hotel (n)[J10].
8
9
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Regarding the overdraft cluster, the appellant argued that it never authorized the respondent
bank to create an overdraft facility, let alone impose charges on it. 12 Counsel insisted that the
trial court erred in failing to recognize that the absence of evidence of any agreement or
authority to transfer money between the appellant’s accounts meant that the transfers violated
the law. 13 Opposing the appellant’s argument, counsel for the respondent, Mr. Mambwe,
agreed with the trial judge’s holding that there was no overdraft per se and that the impugned
charges constituted overdraft charges. 14 To back up the trial court’s holding and the
respondent’s argument that it had the right to overdraw and to charge for the overdraft, Mr.
Mambwe mentioned the standing orders, the terms of the finance leases, and the fact that the
appellant admitted having fallen into arrears. 15
The appellant’s lawyer submitted that, because the standing orders operated in respect of the
appellant’s Dollar account only, the respondent should not have overdrawn the Kwacha
account on the basis of those standing orders. 16 Moreover, common Clauses 14 of the finance
leases empowered the respondent to transfer money in any of the appellant’s accounts towards
the settlement of its debt, this clause did not authorize the respondent to debit the Kwacha
account or any other account where that account had no money, and to thus create an
overdraft. 17 Neither did it permit the respondent to charge interest of 36% to 37% on the
overdraft. 18
The appellant challenged the legality of the respondent’s decision to charge compound interest.
Specifically, the appellant reasoned that, if the respondent set up an overdraft facility to pay
the lease accounts, this setup would prevent any possibility of default in the lease accounts,
thereby precluding the need for any default or late charges. 19 The respondent retorted that,
contrary to what the appellant affirmed, the trial court addressed the question of late charges
when the court found that the respondent’s right to charge the appellant for late payments was
grounded in Clauses 2.4 and 11.3 of the finance leases. 20 Put another way, the finance leases
entitled the respondent to charge compound interest on late payments and for the overdraft. 21
Tackling the extension cluster, the appellant faulted the High Court for neglecting the fact that,
although the respondent imposed in June 2010 a restructuring fee and charged the appellant to
cut monthly installments down to 25,000 US dollars, the respondent kept on charging interest
on installments over and above the restructured payment amount. 22 The respondent had
claimed it levied the restructuring fee (‘extension charges’) because the base rate changed in
2008 from 10% to 12%,23 the parties reduced the monthly repayments, the appellant benefited
and asked for the restructuring, and Clause 17 of finance leases provided for the fee. 24 But the
appellant insisted that the extension charges never formed part of its agreement with the

Chrismar Hotel (n) [J10]-[J11].
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J11]-[J13].
14
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J25].
15
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J25]-[J27], and [J13].
16
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J13]-[J14].
17
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J14]-[J15].
18
See Chrismar Hotel (n) [J15].
19
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J15]-[J16].
20
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J27].
21
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J27].
22
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J14]-[J15].
23
See Chrismar Hotel (n) [J45]. Set by the central bank, the base rate is the minimum rate at which banks can
lend to their customers. The law prohibits banks from lending below that minimum rate.
24
See Chrismar Hotel (n) [J19] and [J26]-[J28].
12
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respondent, nor did anyone adduce evidence that the parties agreed on such charges or that the
respondent expressly notified the appellant of the charges. 25
The appellant maintained that, after it paid the fee of 85,809.40 US dollars to restructure
monthly repayments from 39,000 US dollars to 25,000 US dollars, the respondent continued
to charge the appellant the initial monthly repayment rate. 26
With respect to the third cluster, the appellant submitted that the respondent bank made several
errors. Among others, the respondent failed to explain why it imposed bank charges higher
than the amount that the bank had itself arrived at when it did the reconciliation. 27 The appellant
deemed the gap between the two amounts as revealing late charges and penal interest. 28 In
addition, the respondent erred in finding that Clause 2.4 and Clause 11.3 of the finance leases
both related to compound interest and that the late charges were penal in nature. 29 In particular,
the appellant pointed out that, though the finance leases obliged the respondent to ‘compound’
default interest, 30 the ‘default interest’ applied by the respondent differed from ‘compound
interest’. 31 The respondent applied default interest over and above compound interest. 32 Insofar
as it added an extra 10% to the base rate of 10%, that ‘default interest’ differed from compound
interest and amounted to a punitive interest, which Zambian law forbids. 33
The respondent denied that the High Court had blundered. 34 Regarding the numerical
discrepancies, the respondent countered that the trial judge did not err in ruling in the bank’s
favor because what mattered was the principle on the basis of which the respondent imposed
charges, not the actual figures of those charges. 35 The respondent also submitted that the
appellant misinterpreted the terms of the finance leases, that Zambian banking law 36 allowed
financial institutions to charge interest on overdue payments, and that therefore such interest
did not equate to punitive interest. 37
The court’s rulings
After examining the parties’ submissions and hearing the oral arguments and clarifications, the
Supreme Court ruled on each of the eight grounds that the appellant leveled, and that the
respondent oppugned. Delivering the judgment of the unanimous court, Malila JS ruled for the
appealing hotel on six of the eight grounds.
Starting with the overdraft cluster, Malila JS found that, because no evidence could prove that
the parties agreed to establish an overdraft, the respondent could not overdraw the appellant’s
Kwacha account. 38 Though the common law entitles a bank to combine a customer’s accounts
to settle his debts, a bank cannot exercise that right when an account does not have a credit and
where the parties have not otherwise dealt with the delinquent account by, for example,
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J19].
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J19] and [J20].
27
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J21].
28
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J21].
29
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J22].
30
Clause 11.3, read together In Clause 2.4, of the finance leases.
31
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J22]-[J23].
32
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J22]-[J23].
33
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J23]-[J24]. Counsel for the appellant cited Regulation 10(1) of the Banking and Financial
Services Act (Cost of Borrowing) Regulation to buttress his submission that Zambian law forbids penal interest.
34
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J29]-[J30].
35
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J29].
36
Banking and Financial Services Act (Cost of Borrowing) Regulation, Regulation 10(1).
37
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J29].
38
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J39]-[J40].
25
26
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charging default interest. 39 Malila JS also accepted the appellant’s argument that, since the
respondent overdrew the appellant’s Kwacha account, the overdraft obviated the need for the
respondent to apply default and late charges. 40
In settling the extension cluster, the learned judge ruled that the respondent acted unlawfully
when it levied the restructuring fee without discussing it across the table and agreeing with the
appellant on that fee. 41 Varying the finance leases in this manner without the appellant’s
consent would breach Clause 17.1 of the leases, which obliges both parties to reduce such
variation in writing and to sign the variation. 42 For that reason, Malila JS observed that “the
respondent acted outside the banker customer relationship and the contractual provisions
contained in the lease agreements.” 43 Further noting that the appellant never got value for the
restructuring fee that it paid (since the respondent never restructured the monthly payments),
the Supreme Court denounced the fee as “an extortionist charge”. 44
While broaching the composite cluster, Malila JS dissented from the High Court judge’s
position that the discrepancy between the extension charges actually paid and those declared
during reconciliation. 45 Malila said that the disparate figures played a decisive role, for
otherwise the Supreme Court would not have managed to assess the veracity of the stories that
the parties told the Court. 46
However, Malila JS set aside the remaining two grounds of appeal because he determined that
the terms of the finance leases clearly allowed the respondent to charge compound interest.47
He found that Clause 2.4 and Clause 11.3 of the leases complemented each other: Clause 2.4
of the leases generally stated that the respondent could charge interest on arrears while Clause
11.3 specified the rate of interest (i.e., 10% per year). 48 Hence Clause 11.3 did not introduce
any new penal interest. 49
In the end, the Supreme Court upheld the appellant’s appeal. Because the respondent created
an overdraft facility without the appellant’s consent, the court ordered that the overdraft cover
charges be reversed. 50 And, given the overall outcome of the case, the court ordered the
respondent bank to pay the costs. 51
Significance of the case
By demonstrating Malila’s ability to drill down to the essential components of complex finance
disputes, this case takes on a starker relief, especially after President Hakainde Hichilema
appointed and sworn in Malila as Zambia’s Chief Justice. 52 The highly technical points that
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J39]-[J42].
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J42]-[J43].
41
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J45].
42
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J45]-[J46]. On several occasions, counsel for the appellant drew the court’s attention to
Clause 17 of the finance leases, which provided for non-variation and indulgence. See Chrismar Hotel (n) [J15]
and [J19]-[J20].
43
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J47].
44
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J49].
45
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J49]-[J50].
46
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J49]-[J50].
47
See Chrismar Hotel (n) [J50]-[J52].
48
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J51].
49
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J52].
50
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J52].
51
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J54].
52
President Hakainde Hichilema appointed Malila as Zambia’s Chief Justice on 17 November 2021 and sworn
him into office on 22 December 2021.
39
40
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these disputes bring up call for consummate analytical skills, which will then enable the new
Chief Justice to tackle the constitutional aspects of disputes about finances.
Aside from this, the Chrismar Hotel case does raise concerns about consumer protection.
Indeed, the bank charges that depositors often encounter without knowing what warrants them
are precisely the circumstances that prompted jurisdictions like South Africa to institute the
Financial Sector Conduct Authority. Malila JS appears to recognize the necessity to protect
consumers and stop unprincipled banks from taking advantage of the less financially savvy. He
deplored the “hugely unfair” attitude of the respondent who fashioned bank charges so as to
maximize profit “at the expense of the appellant” and who let the charges “snowball out of
control”: 53
There is no doubt whatsoever that the respondent bank in the circumstances as
described utilised the inability of the appellant to be current on its lease repayments to
curve out maximum profitability for itself. If the respondent bank had considered, even
for a moment, the financial interests of the appellant, the creation of the overdraft
facility and the charging of overdraft charges and default interest at the same time,
should not have occurred.
The unanimous court somewhat remedied Chrismar Hotel’s bank charges, still it has not
resolved this issue for the rest of bank depositors, most of whom do not understand the nittygritty of those charges – a situation that threatens financial inclusion. Obviously, the appellant
hotel has more financial resources and sophistication than ordinary bank customers. For that
reason, a durable solution to multi-faceted bank charges calls for something more than just a
law prohibiting penal charges, more than just a court judgment that forbids such charges.
Conclusion
Chrismar Hotel has demonstrated Malila CJ’s analysis and synthesis of intricate finance
disagreements. These skills manifested, for example, when Malila determined that the whole
overdraft question hinged on whether the parties had, in fact, agreed on an overdraft facility.
In doing so, he distinguished between a loan and an overdraft. 54 The learned judge did not
explain why this dichotomy mattered, but the dichotomy decides the whole overdraft question
because a loan, as evidenced by the parties’ finance leases, does not automatically entail an
overdraft: The parties must conclude a separate, distinct agreement to establish an overdraft
facility. This acute sense of analysis, synthesis and significance will serve Malila CJ in the
Constitutional Court when adjudicating on commercial law disputes, though he will only be
expected to approach those disputes from a constitutional perspective.
Even from that perspective, the Chrismar Hotel case drew forth conundrums whose resolution
requires a firm grasp of the Constitution. These issues notably feature freedom of contract.
Indeed, freedom of contract underlies the market economy. In this respect, it is a
‘constitutional’ principle of the Zambian legal system. Article 10(1) of the Constitution obliges
the government to “create an economic environment which encourages individual initiative…

Chrismar Hotel (n) [J43].
Chrismar Hotel (n) [J30]-[J31]. Malila JS distinguished these two credit agreements as follows: A ‘loan’ denotes
a special arrangement whereby a bank advances to a customer a specified, definite amount of money. The
customer may withdraw the approved amount at once, in which case the bank debits the amount against the
customer’s account. By contrast, a customer uses and enjoys an ‘overdraft’ gradually as needs arise, up to the
maximum amount approved by the bank. Unlike a loan, an overdraft facility does not require that the customer
reaches the limit of the sum approved by the bank.
53
54
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so as to promote investment, employment and wealth.” 55 Chrismar Hotel teaches depositors
and policymakers this lesson: Complex bank charges may end up breaching the bank-customer
relationship. More generally, complex bank charges may subvert freedom of contract. Future
litigation before the Constitutional Court will afford the new Chief Justice opportunities to
delve more deeply into and expound on the freedom-of-contract principle to ensure that the
entire banking system caters to the needs of customers, and not simply the profit-maximizing
goals of capital owners.
Had it systematically factored in commerce and the economy, how would the Supreme Court
have approached Chrismar Hotel? This case shows that, while overdraft facilities generate
more profits than loans, 56 the respondent accepted to extend a loan rather than insisting on an
overdraft. Not only would the overdraft have avoided the default and late charges that the
appellant incurred, but it would also have avoided the costs of this litigation. With an overdraft,
the parties could have even prevented the restructuring fee, depending on the limit of the
overdraft. This implies that the parties poorly designed their agreement. They should have
structured their agreement as an overdraft from the start.
Crucially, the parties should not have empowered the respondent to charge default interest on
the base rate. Malila JS mistakenly construed Clause 2.4 and Clause 11.3 of the leases because
they do not follow the mathematical formula for compound interest. 57 Moreover, lenders
typically calculate compound interest based on the principal or the interest accumulated over
the past time periods, and not based on a base rate. Malila JS should have ruled – like the
appellant invited him to do – that the default interest, though not necessarily punitive, differed
from compound interest. The devil in the detail of finance disputes can elude even eagle-eyed
analysts as seasoned and skilled as the new Chief Justice.

1991 Constitution of Zambia, as amended by Act 2 of 2016. Emphasis added. Article 10 is entitled “Basis of
economic policies”.
56
The respondent charged 36% to 37% on the overdraft. See Chrismar Hotel (n) [J15].
57
The mathematical formula for compound interest looks like this: A = P(1 + r/n)(nt), where P stands for the
principal balance, r for the interest rate, n for the number of times interest is compounded per time period, and t
for the number of time periods.
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